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As we approach the sixth anniversary of Severe Respiratory
Distress Syndrome (SARS) I wish to add the perspective of
a frontline medical leader during the pandemic to the
recommendations made by federal and provincial commis-
sions. The lessons learned from events leading up to and
during SARS need to be communicated to prepare our
hospitals and communities for future respiratory pandemics.
The diagnosis of viral respiratory illness is based on both
clinical and radiographic criteria. Preparedness for respira-
tory pandemics requires optimally functioning radiography
equipment as well as the contribution and expertise of radi-
ologists. This should be included among the lessons learned
from the Ontario SARS experience.
In 2003 SARS, an airborne viral illness of the corona
virus type, spread from China to North America. In Toronto,
Ontario, there was a primary phase, as well as a secondary
phase during which the infection spread back into the
community from hospitalized patients. There have been 2
commissions to assess the Ontario SARS experience. The
federal commission (Naylor report) [1] focused on system-
wide and public health issues to be addressed when dealing
with future pandemics. The provincial commission (SARS
Commission Report) by the late Justice Archie Campbell [2]
looked at the SARS experience from the provincial and
hospital perspectives.
Diseases spread by respiratory transmission within
hospitals depends on the professionals within the Medical
Imaging Department to provide effective detection and
diagnosis of the acute respiratory illness. In addition to
disease detection during pandemics, radiologists also can
offer specific expertise in risk assessment for health care
organizations during and between pandemics.
Radiologists also have expertise in the assessment of
issues of quality control and disease monitoring. The
funneling of patients through the Imaging Department
positions radiologists to identify clusters of complications
and diseases that have radiographic manifestations.
Both the Naylor report [1] and SARS Commission reports
[2] noted that hospital radiologists raised concerns about the
recurrence of SARS weeks before there was formal
acknowledgement of a secondary source for the disease. In
addition to this important observation by the commissions I
believe that there are additional lessons that can be learned0846-5371/$ - see front matter  2009 Canadian Association of Radiologists.from viewing the SARS experience through a radiologist’s
perspective.
Radiographic Equipment
Radiography is essential in the detection of respiratory
infection during pandemics. The Ontario health care system
during the 1980s and 1990s experienced operating deficits.
Hospitals and outpatient facilities funded operating deficits at
the expense of capital investment, leading to aged radio-
graphic equipment throughout the system. In clinics and
hospitals in Ontario in 2003 it was not uncommon to find
equipment in use well beyond the usual expected operating
life. Such aged equipment was prone to frequent breakdowns
as well as diminishing sensitivity to subtle radiographic
abnormalities.
The demonstration of subtle pulmonary abnormalities by
radiography requires optimally functioning radiography
equipment, and the images should be reviewed under ideal
conditions. There have been significant technological
advances over the past 2 decades, and it is unreasonable that
hospital-based physicians should have had to rely on 20-year-
old technology as the first line of defense in detecting subtle
respiratory infiltrates during a pandemic. Preparedness for
pandemics requires regular and timely replacement of radio-
graphic equipment approaching the end of its useful life.
I also note that during both the initial phase (SARS 1) and
secondary phase (SARS 2) of the pandemic, computed
tomography (CT) of the chest often detected infiltrates in
patient with suspected SARS with negative radiographs. This
reflected the increased sensitivity of the CT technology
compared with the images produced by the radiographic
equipment. Planning for future pandemics will need to
account for surge capacity in CT imaging to supplement
general radiography.
Establishing New Measurable Standards for
Radiography
Radiographic safety and diagnosis depends on a sequence
of processes that can be measured using both quantitative or
qualitative measures. Measurements need to go beyond the
standard Healing Arts Radiation Protection Act (HARP)
testing to determine if equipment is clinically adequate.
HARP standards for equipment focus primarily on radiation
exposure. Measurements need to include additional param-
eters such as frequency of equipment breakdowns, testingAll rights reserved.
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ities, standards for lighting and noise in radiographic
reporting areas, assessment of lighting for workstations (or
view boxes when used), as well as accuracy and timeliness of
radiology transcription.
HARP testing as currently mandated is insufficient to
assess the entire process of creating an image and trans-
mitting the report. Therefore, HARP testing is but a sampling
of the process affecting patient risk and safety, not
a comprehensive assessment of the efficacy and safety of the
radiographic images and processes. Whenever a radiologist
is concerned about the adequacy of the radiography equip-
ment and images, the fact that the equipment has met
the standards for HARP testing may have no bearing on the
acceptability of the diagnostic image or the accuracy of the
final report,
Preparedness for pandemics should include the estab-
lishment of standards for the equipment and processes to
achieve the highest sensitivity for subtle infiltrates, achieved
at the lowest possible radiation doses, and communicated in
the most timely and effective manner.
Provincial standards also should require that the Medical
Director of the Imaging Department take responsibility for
and sign off on the adequacy of the radiography equipment
as well as the entire process and working conditions dealing
with the production and interpretation of medial imaging
studies. This should become the new normal because the
occurrence of pandemics may have short lead times.
Therefore, quality concerns of Medical Directors in Medical
Imaging Departments about radiography must be addressed
proactively, and solving these issues needs to go beyond
defaulting to the standards set by the HARP Act.
The Role of the Radiologist and the Chief Radiologist
The importance of the radiologists in the detection of
respiratory airborne diseases in the index hospital was
acknowledged by the authors of the federal and provincial
reports. The presumptive diagnoses of recurrent SARS made
by individual radiologists were transmitted to the attending
clinicians verbally and through radiology reports. There was
no centralized process to collate and analyse all the radiology
reports for new diagnoses of suspected pneumonia. It is
recommend that within each hospital, and possibly each
region, that there be a centralized system to collate and
analyse multiple radiologists’ reports for key words or
phrases to detect clusters of respiratory disease on wards, or
changes in the incidence of respiratory infiltrates within an
institution, or even within the community. This is easier to
implement where there is an electronic patient record.
There also needs to be a seamless and simple process in
which a radiologist can forward specific reports to the Chief
Radiologist (Medical Director) and an infection control team
for review. This is useful not only during pandemics, but is
also of value for the identification of clusters of cases
suspicious for more common infectious diseases including
influenza and tuberculosis.The flow of patients and their imaging from throughout
the hospital and community through the radiology depart-
ment gives the Chief Radiologist a unique institutional
perspective of risks and disease occurrence throughout the
entire hospital. Often a radiologist is able to detect trends and
clusters of disease occurring in a hospital well before clinical
colleagues.
The concerns of the Chief Radiologist and the radiologists
on issues of equipment safety or image quality need to be
taken seriously and dealt with in a timely fashion. Few
professionals in the hospital have the knowledge and expe-
rience of radiologists in the areas of risk assessment arising
from deficiencies in the process of creating the medical
image and the radiology report. Acknowledgement of and
responding to the concerns of medical imaging professionals
about the adequacy of equipment technology and processes
will ensure that our hospitals and patients will be prepared
for respiratory pandemics.
The radiologists, including the Chief Radiologist, should
be protected from recrimination if they follow a defined
process in reporting their concerns about institutional risk,
both specific to medical imaging as well as any risk to
patients throughout the entire health care organization [3].
Risk Assessment
The study of the SARS experience must address the issue
of risk assessment. Justice Campbell’s [2] report inferred that
risk identification and assessment may have been an issue
during the second phase of SARS.
The decision makers were dealing with a new disease, of
unclear etiology and incubation period, with a large potential
population at risk. The disease appeared to arise in clusters,
and spread from epicenters.
A radiologist is taught that when a low-level threat could
affect large populations then the risk needs to be to dealt with
aggressively to reduce it to a minimum level as reasonably
achievable for each individual patient at each encounter.
Application of this principle during the SARS epidemic should
have led to conservative assumptions of incubation times and
thus prolonged the use of protective measures for employees
and patients well beyond standard known incubation times
when dealing with new or unknown infectious entities.
Radiologists also are trained to handle mass casualty
events such as occurring from nuclear contamination. In such
situations all potential victims are isolated, and aggressive
steps are taken to contain the event. Applying this principle
to the management of SARS would have led to the aggres-
sive isolation of the hospitals affected during the initial phase
of SARS, as well as the strict closure of wards on the
suspicion of internal transmission of disease within
a hospital.
Recommendations
The following are recommendations for dealing with
future respiratory pandemics.
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radiologists about the safety of imaging equipment and
the quality of medical images. Resolution of such issues
needs to be transparent and timely.
 Regular testing of radiographic equipment needs to be
supplemented by the testing of additional factors including
equipment sensitivity, availability, and reliability; the
quality of the medical image; the work and safety condi-
tions of technologists, radiologists, and patients; as well as
the timeliness and accuracy of transcription.
 The chief radiologist should be required to sign off
annually on the adequacy of the radiography equipment
as well as the entire imaging process including working
conditions involved in the interpretation of studies and
the preparation and communication of the report.
 The quality of the inventory of radiographic equipment
and technology in hospitals and clinics needs to be
reviewed regularly. Replacement must be planned for,
independent of anticipated government funding.
 During pandemics radiography may need to be
augmented by the use of CT in symptomatic persons with
negative radiographs. Planning for pandemics requires
planning for surge capacity for CT use.
 The radiology report needs to be in a format that will
enable ongoing surveillance and analysis. This would
be facilitated by the use of an electronic medical
record.
 Radiologists should be included as part of the adminis-
trative teams dealing with ongoing surveillance for acute
respiratory illness. The Chief Radiologist also needs to
be a member of any committees dealing with potential
pandemics.
 There should be a whistleblower policy in every health
care organization that protects all professionals,
including physician leaders, who identify and reportsuspected risks using established and agreed upon
protocols.
The medical and nursing personnel in Ontario during
SARS provided exemplary and courageous care during
a crisis that was unprecedented in our generation in Canada.
Radiologists served a critical role in the detection and
management of disease during the pandemic, despite often
relying on equipment that has been described as obsolete. To
draw on the expertise of radiologists, the radiologist must be
part of the organizational decision-making process, and they
must have effective equipment at their disposal. The imple-
mentation of these recommendations may enhance our
ability to recognize clusters of disease during pandemics.
These recommendations also may decrease the risk of
unrecognized in-hospital transmission and the subsequent
secondary propagation of disease back into the community.
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